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CITATIONS TO TRANSCRIPTS 
There are two transcripts in this matter: a transcript of 
the evidentiary hearing held on March 21, 
of the closing arguments on April 9, 1987. 
1987 and a transcript 
The transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing will be referred to a^ "March Tr." and the 
transcript of the closing argument will be(referred to as "April 
Tr,". Pages and line numbers will be designated by decimals (.) 
so that a reference to page 3, line 11, will appear as 3.11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 2, 1987, the lower Court is|sued an Order to Show 
Cause requiring Defendant to appear before |the Court on March 24, 
1987, to show cause why certain orders shodld not be entered with 
respect to visitation and the interpretation of provisions of the 
1 
Decree of Divorce relating to child support. (R. 303). 
The basis of the Order to Show Cause was an affidavit 
submitted by Defendant (R. 244) wherein Defendant stated, among 
other things, that: 
(a) Plaintiff had refused to allow him visitation with the 
minor children by constantly claiming unavailability of the 
children by reason of prior plans made by Plaintiff; 
(b) Plaintiff had falsely claimed arrearages in child 
support payments and had sought and obtained assistance from the 
Office of Recovery Services who had initiated enforcement 
procedures. At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Defendant 
proffered evidence in support of these claims (March Tr. 4.17; 
10.3; 10.15; 10.24 & 11.6). 
The Order to Show Cause further claimed interference in the 
sale of the family home. However, those issues are now moot 
insofar as this appeal is concerned. 
The basis of the dispute with respect to child support 
arrearages was that Plaintiff interpreted paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
the Divorce Decree to provide that in the event of Plaintiff's 
remarriage, Defendant was obligated to continue making the 
mortgage payments on the family and also to simultaneously 
increase child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of the 
mortgage payment. Under Plaintiff's interpretation, which was 
unilaterally conceived and not submitted to the Court for 
approval, Defendant would have been seriously in arrears in child 
support payments in a sum equal to one-third of the monthly 
2 
mortgage payment since Plaintiff fs remarriage in August, 1984. 
With respect tu til: le cl :i,:i I d suppor t: i ssi ie, Defendai 1 t: coi it ended 
that paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree provided that: in the event 
of Plaintiff's remarriage, Defendant's obligation to make the 
house payment wuulml cuds^ w "' r.-M . rease in his 
obligation to pay child suppon i.n : -sn <j'iu,ij z>. rwo-thirds of 
the house payment. 
At tl le hearing on Marct . . I1 - oth par* >. •-•' :n..lated 
and if mere appeared 
could call witnesses 
that the relevant facts could be proffered 
to ht» .I dispute in U" n Facts, either partyl 
to testify (March Tr. 3,13 to 3.20), The proffers were received 
by the Court and both of the parties testified concerning facts 
i: e I a t L n g I! i m ' i. s I!: a 1". i <.> i i. 
At the hearing -- March 24, 1987, each party had full 
opportunity to present evidence. However |, Plaintiff requested 
leave to f::i ] e a memor ai ldi lm ai id sucl i ] eav e w as gi an ted. ( March Tr. 
19.10) On or about April .: :9b nin^ (9) days after the 
evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff submitted an 
a memorandum (R, 31 1 ) , Defendant objected to 1:1 le untimely 
proffer of additional facts inasmuch as the hearing had been 
concluded anil Defendant w.is nn.ilhlp tu tile a opposing affidavit 
(April Tr. V . 1 8 ) . The Court made a decision on the meaning of 
paragraphs 7 and 8 oi the Decree without ruling on the objection 
(Apr i I Tr .'! , J "J In .'I ,' ) . 
On April 21, 1987, the Court entered its Order in the matter 
(hereinafter "Subject O r d e r " ) . A copy of the Subject Order is 
affidavit rather than 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
BETTINGER vs. BETT1NGER 
Civil NO.87-0500-CA 
Point I Summary 
The Subject Order did not constitute a J modification of the 
Decree of Divorce so as to require the filing of a petition for 
modification. Even if the Subject Ordet did constitute a 
modification, Rule 9, Third Judicial District Court Rules of 
Practice, was not in effect when the matter ^as presented to the 
lower court. 
Plaintiff waived any claim with respect to the absence of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law inasmuch as such claim 
was not raised before the trial court at the hearing on 
Plaintiff's objections to the Subject Order and motion for new 
trial. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of taw are not required 
when the reasoning of the Court is apparent and the Order is 
supported by the evidence. Even if Findings and Conclusions were 
required, the Subject Order is not invalidate^. 
Point II Summary 
Plaintiff has waived any claim that thej Subject Order does 
not accurately reflect the Court's deci$ion on visitation 
inasmuch as such objection was not presented to the trial court. 
Point III Summary 
Plaintiff waived any claim of error wjith respect to the 
award of attorneys fees by stipulating to the admission of 
Exhibit 7-D (copies of attorney's billings)j and by failing to 
raise any issue as to any reasonableness of the fees before the 
4(a) 
trial court. Inasmuch as only a fraction of the fees were 
awarded, the reasonableness of the fees is not in issue, 
Point IV Summary 
The Court followed established rules pf construction and 
interpreting paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree, and the lower 
court's interpretation is supported by the weirding of the Decree 
and any extrinsic evidence that may have been considered by the 
lower court. 
4(b) 
because: (a) Said paragraphs constituted a modification of the 
Decree in violation of Rule 9, Third District Court Rules of 
Practice; and, (b) the Court failed to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in support of paragraphs 1 and 4 of the 
Subject Order. 
A. Compliance with Rule 9 
The Subject Order was the result of a hearing on an Order to 
Show Cause entered by the Court on March 2, 1987. At that time, 
the present version of Rule 9 upon which Plaintiff relies was not 
in effect. Thus, there was no necessity for filing a petition 
for modification. Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
Subject Order constitutes a modification of the Decree with 
respect to visitation, the Order to Show Cause properly brought 
the issue before the trial court. 
The current version of Rule 9, discussed by Plaintiff in her 
brief, was not in effect until June 1, 1987. Thus, on the date 
that the Order to Show Cause was issued, arjd on the date of the 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause, a modification did not need 
to comply with the current version of Rule 9 as cited by 
Plaintiff in her brief. 
It is difficult to conceive of how paragraph 1 of the 
Subject Order could be construed as a "modification" of the 
Decree. The Court made a decision to resolve a problem with 
visitation by establishing a detailed visitation schedule to 
avoid "prior plans" claimed by Plaintiff. Moreover, the 
structured visitation schedule is well yithin the scope of 
"reasonable visitation". Paragraph 1 of the Subject Order is a 
clarification of an existing Decree rather than a "modification" 
of the Decree. Thus, a finding of changed circumstances was 
unnecessary. Moreover, the interference with Defendant's 
visitation, which has occurred since the date of the Decree, is a 
material change if such a change is necessary. 
Paragraph 4 of the Subject Order, which interprets 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree, cannot be considered a 
"modification". The Court merely resolved the conflicting 
interpretations. The wording of paragraph 7 of the Decree was 
not changed or modified, it was clarified and construed. 
Paragraph 7 and 8 of the Decree have the same meaning after 
issuance of the Subject Order as they did prior to the issuance 
of the Subject Order. The Court merely rejected Plaintiff's 
interpretation of those paragraphs. 
B. Findings of Fact 
Plaintiff argues that paragraph 1 of the Subject Order 
should be reversed because the lower court did not enter Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
All of Plaintiff's claims that the trial court should have 
entered Findings and/or Conclusions on various issues have been 
waived by Plaintiff inasmuch as such claims were never mentioned 
or argued to the trial court. It is well established that a 
party may not raise issues on appeal that were not presented in 
the lower court. Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); 
English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Lane vs. Messer, 
6 
732 P . 2d 4flM i l! tah 1 986 ); Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company, 
6 9 2 P .2-1 7,:<4 i i"i ,>|. i QM'M ) . 
The entry of Fi ndings and Concl us ions i i I support of 
paragraph -'* Subjec* 'rdor mnece?? •-" Ar.yune 
• • • - . - , • - i t - . . . i - ^ h e 
Cour s dec . <; .n„ defendant assertec • • i* i - , *-
unjustifiably denying visitatio. * uiaiming 
pi: :I c i: pi ai is Tl n obvious sol . t ; ^ n w?° -*-^  . - ^ uht- .-I ue tailed 
visitation schedule .*. ''.<:* Plaint i f-* < : .ive a-ivancf« notice 
of visitation and thereh\ - * . 
The decisions *- Supreme Court nui-j that tnei -
presumption that . . . considered all relevant e/icir 
.affel v^~ Paffel, 
1986); Walker vs. Walker, ^°"' ".2d ~~ i 9 B c • p a r t y 
claiming error I iy + « * .. - * - - - r ; - + * e n t e r • •.: 
• fiii I 1.1 ui<: I usiuii in in in leuu". .,L;;U ^nis presumption. 
Ibid. Plaintiff has completely failer * rebut this presumption. 
The case ±aw further holds that il 111 M nv i denrc' njbmi t t I-M| ! i 
tl :ie Court supports the Courtf s decisioi I, F i ridings and Conclusions 
are not required. Paffel vs. Paffel ^upra; Walker vs. Walker, 
supra. I' . w • * -:; • *-w • -1--- ' - "• 
court: supporter ;,,«-- decision reflected in paragraph * re 
Subject Order. 
"Iti*'1 ?-M" J -ii'l l'',i I" ji'i'" u n n e c e s s a r y wi th respect 
to paragraph * Subject Order inasmuch < -o * actual. 
determination was involved. Constructic 
7 
a matter of law. Even if it be assumed, for the sake of 
argument, that paragraph 4 of the Subject Order involved a 
determination of fact, the principles noted in the Paffel and 
Walker estciblish that findings are unnecessary. 
A Conclusion of Law in support of paragraph 4 of the Subject 
Order is unnecessary inasmuch as the Court's decision is readily 
apparent from the Order itself. The only possible Conclusion of 
Law would be a verbatim quotation of the Order. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Findings and 
Conclusions should have been entered, the remedy is not reversal 
of the Subject Order. The proper remedy would be to remand the 
case to the lower court with instructions to enter Findings and 
Conclusions. In order to obtain a reversal of the order, 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that there was a 
misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law that resulted in 
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the decisions of the Court or that a 
serious inequity resulted so as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). Mere 
failure to enter Findings or Conclusions does not make the order 
invalid. 
II. 
THE SUBJECT ORDER ACCURATELY STATES THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE COURT'S RULING 
Plaintiff asserts that paragraphs 1(b), (d), (e), (f), (g) 
and (h) do not accurately reflect the substance of the Court's 
8 
oral decision In the matter. 
in l-hiri! regard, 
(Apr.. '"I'II in -!,/: I , aragraph. : . .- lie 
supported by 1 he record (March Tr ?7, 1 » Although paragraph 
' i l l in I f i n i l III
 ( ni i t tm o u t I hi 111 II ln> i ' i j i I '" 'i I 11 11 II d e c i s i o n , 
paragraph 1(g) specifies less visitation than the Court ordered 
so that Plaintiff has no cause to complain. 
T'lht"'1' . -
 t rplates to vis: tat .on 
of the father Father s ,J.S" paragraph n o isitat. ion : r 
two (2) hour^ -•!- Christmas 1: r *, oven numbered .- '..-r-it;: 
] (f)) ai id "\ . .-t.c:" . ' .. .ourc on the child's birthday 
(paragraph l ( h 
X t 1 : 1 I'M ' 1 i ill) '" I l i e i: LOS 11 nj 
arguments were presented -^  „.- ai Ap11.1. '"), 1987, a dr n t: f 
of the Subject Order containing the detailed visitation schedule 
i .Vis id the hiiiiii I'1;; ,o ridiiiL-Lil . '" s a u o m t s y I Apr. i.i. Tr & 
17.5) The draft contained the exact language of tr^ .e final Order 
except as to additional items discussed at Lae neari . . r. 
During that hearing, Plaintiff's attorney noted -.il. .-f * s,t-
problems with respect: to the proposed Orde r ( Apr i 1 Tr 
items of w! licl I P] ainti ff now complains were not mentis nti Apr., 
Tr. 17-18) Thus, Plaintiff has waived the objections. Paffel 
vs. Paffel, supr a; English vs. .*-.L*i.^ *., supra; Lane vs. Messer, 
supra; Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company, supra. 
Even if the objections had not been waived, the items of 
9 
which Plaintiff complains are fair and reasonable. Moreover, it 
must be presumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that 
Judge Young read the Subject Order at the time it was signed and 
approved of the items of which Plaintiff now complains. See 
Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker, supra. 
With respect to the Christmas visitation (paragraph 1(f)), 
Plaintiff's standing to complain is questionable. The visitation 
specified in the Order is much less than orally directed by the 
Court (March Tr. 27). 
III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEB 
Plaintiff asserts that the award of attorneys fees should be 
reversed because there was no evidence that the fees were 
reasonable. This issue, like many other issues raised by 
Plaintiff in this appeal, is raised for the first time before 
this Court. During the course of the March evidentiary hearing, 
Plaintiff made no suggestion of any issue of reasonableness of 
fees. 
The evidence on attorneys fees was submitted to the Court in 
the form of an exhibit which was marked as Exhibit 7-D (March Tr, 
10-12). At that the conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff made no 
objection with respect to the admission of Exhibit 7-D. In this 
regard, note the following quotation from page 32 of the March 
Transcript: 
"Judge Young:...Let me ask, before we go 
formally into recess, we did not enter the 
exhibits. Do you wish them to be -
10 
Mr. McDonald: I would offer them into 
evidence, your Honor. 
Judge Young: 
exhibits? 
Any objection to those 
Ms. Corporon: I still haven't had an 
opportunity to look at them, youtf Honor. I 
assume they are summary exhibits of his 
testimony. I don't have any objection, your 
Honor. 
Judge Young: They will be received. 
(Where upon, Defendant's Exhibits 1-8 were 
offered and received into evidence.) (March 
Tr. 32). 
It should further be noted that the is^ bue of reasonableness 
of the fees is irrelevant inasmuch as only a 
were awarded. Exhibit 7-D established fees 
in the sum of $3,340.75. The total award cff attorneys fees was 
only $500.00. 
At no time during the hearing did Plaintiff question the 
reasonableness of the attorneys fees noted in Exhibit 7-D 
IV. 
fraction of the fees 
Incurred by Defendant 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF 
OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff contends that the Court committed error in 
interpreting the provisions of paragraphs 7 ^nd 8 of the original 
Decree. 
Plaintiff's argument is based upon thrjee totally unfounded 
assumptions: (a) the Court ignored the rjjles of construction 
established in various Supreme Court cases; (b) the Court was 
unable to ascertain the intent of the parties from the wording of 
PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 
11 
the Decree; (c) the Court relied on extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intent of the parties. 
It is apparent that the Court closely followed the rules of 
construction as set forth in Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 
P. 2d 1060 (Utah 1981). That rule of construction requires that 
the Court first attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties 
from the wording of the instrument. It is only when the intent 
cannot be determined from the wording of the instrument that the 
Court turns to extrinsic evidence. 
It makes no difference whether the Court determined the 
intent of the parties from the wording of the Decree or from 
evidence proffered by the parties. In either event, the result 
is the same. 
A. Determination of Intent From Wording of Decree 
The intent of the parties is apparent from an analysis of 
the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree. The wording of 
paragraphs 7 and 8 is as follows: 
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property 
of the marriage in the form of a home located 
at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half 
of the equity that may be in the house at the 
time of liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value increases). 
The equity is defined as the fair market 
value or sales price at the time Defendant 
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set 
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, 
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and 
costs of sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest child 
reaches 18, or until the home is sold or 
until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence 
of any of these events, two-thirds of the 
house payments then made shall be converted 
12 
to child support an that sum shall be paid to 
t h e P l a i n t i f f on a monthly 
additional child support. 
basis as 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making 
the payments on the home. Defendant shall 
also be entitled to take the entire interest 
portion of the house payment as ja deduction 
for himself as well as three (3)| income tax 
exemptions on the children with Pjlaintiff to 
receive one exemption on the youhgest child 
at the present time." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984 
Thereafter, she and her new husband resided 
domicile for approximately one year (March 
(March Tr. 15.10). 
in the former marital 
Tr. 15.14) and then 
arranged for tenants to occupy the home (Marjch Tr. 15.19). 
Plaintiff contends that paragraph 7 |means that upon her 
remarriage or sale of the family home, Defendant's obligations 
for support increase because Defendant niust continue making 
mortgage payments on the home where she and her new husband 
resided (an impossibility if the home is sold) and Defendant must 
also increase child support payments in an |amount equal to two-
thirds of the mortgage payment. 
Defendant contends that paragraph 7 means upon Plaintiff's 
remarriage or upon sale of the home, his obligations decrease in 
that he no longer is obligated to make the mortgage payment, but 
pays a greater amount of child support in la sum equal to two-
thirds of the mortgage payment (adjusted for children reaching 
the age of majority and children who thereafter reside with 
Defendant). 
An analysis of the wording of the Decree in the 
circumstances under which the underlying contract was negotiated, 
13 
clearly demonstrates that Defendant interpretation is correct. 
The parties could not have intended the interpretation 
asserted by Plaintiff. Under Plaintiff's contention, when the 
home is sold (an event in the same category as her remarriage), 
Defendant must continue to make the mortgage payment. Obviously, 
such an interpretation cannot stand inasmuch as after a sale of 
the home, there would be no mortgage payment. Thus, it is 
apparent that the parties intended that upon the occurrence of 
any one of the events in paragraph 7 such as Plaintiff's 
remarriage or the sale of the home, Defendant's obligation to 
make the mortgage payment would cease and his child support 
obligations would increase in an amount equal to two-thirds of 
the mortgage payment previously made. 
It is common knowledge that when a divorced woman remarries 
she thereby obtains an additional source of support through the 
earning capacity of her new husband. Such an obvious fact was 
apparent to parties at the time they negotiated the agreement 
underlying the Decree. In such a circumstance, it would be 
logical to assume that any adjustment conditional upon remarriage 
would result in a decrease of support rather than an increase. 
At that the time the parties negotiated the contract 
underlying the Decree, it would be ludicrous to assume that 
Defendant intended to provide a residence for Plaintiff's new 
husband in the event of remarriage. Thus, it is logical to 
conclude that when a divorce decree dictates a change upon 
remarriage of the wife, the parties did not intend that the 
14 
former husband would pay for the residence ojf the new husband. 
In construing the Decree, words shbuld be given their 
logical meaning. In this regard, Defendant calls the Court's 
attention to the word "converted". According to Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1974 edition, the word "converted" means 
"...to change from one form to another" anq "...to exchange for 
an equivalent". On the basis of this definition, if two-thirds 
of the house payment is "converted" to child support, there can 
no longer be a house payment. 
Any logical view of the situation would demand the 
i 
construction placed upon paragraphs 7 and 8 j by the Court. It is 
apparent that the parties, in the face of Plaintiff's remarriage, 
were making adjustments for the pre-marria^je tax consequences. 
If Plaintiff is making the mortgage payments 
deduction for the portion attributable to iriterest. At or about 
the time that the underlying contract was negotiated, Plaintiff 
was receiving a tax benefit equal to approximately one-third of 
the mortgage payment. It is apparent that 
the conversion from house payment to child 
the after tax impact on Defendant. 
B. Determination of Intent from Extrinsic Evidence 
1 
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the 
lower Court turned to extrinsic evidence to ctonstrue paragraphs 7 
and 8 of the Decree, the Court was not boundj to accept the self-
serving statements of Plaintiff especially When such statements 
are totally outside the realm of reason land contradicted by 
\ he is entitled to a 
the parties intended 
support to equalize 
15 
Defendant's evidence. Plaintiff contended that Defendant agreed 
to continue to make the house payment so as to benefit from a 
"real estate investment". Obviously, no person would consent to 
an "investment" whereby such person would pay the entire cost and 
receive half of the value. 
Defendant proffered evidence contrary to the evidence that 
was untimely submitted by Plaintiff in her affidavit filed after 
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. Defendant proffered 
that the negotiations leading up to the agreement upon which the 
Decree was based centered upon the proposition that upon 
Plaintiff's remarriage Defendant's overall obligation would 
decrease in an amount equal to one-third of the house payment 
(March Tr. 4.25); that Defendant did not intend to provide 
support to Plaintiff's new husband (March Tr. 5.11); and, that 
since Defendant had a substantial investment in the home, he 
would continue to make the house payment as a credit against 
child support (March Tr. 6.10). Had it not been for the untimely 
proffer evidence by Plaintiff, Defendant would have proffered 
additional evidence of intent (See April Tr. 7-8). However, the 
evidence that was proffered by Defendant clearly supports the 
decision of the lower court. 
With respect to Plaintiff's claim of error in failing to 
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Defendant 
incorporates by reference his arguments set forth in Section I of 
this brief. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The majority of points raised by Plaintiff in her brief are 
raised for the first time on appeal. The few issues that were 
submitted to the trial court were properly determined. Plaintiff 
has totally failed to demonstrate a basis for reversal on any 
issue raised in her brief, i.e., [that there was a 
misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, or thfrt the decision was 
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or that a 
serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English vs. English, supra.' On these grounds, 
Defendant submits that the Subject Order should be affirmed in 
its entirety. 
DATED this *1P* day of June, 1988. 
Robert M. 
Attorney for 
McDonald 
Defendant-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1988, I 
served -a true and accurate -edpy of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief upon the following named persons by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake CityX UT 8 
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Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
APR ;•> I -987 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF] SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D-80-931 
josh vff 
\ 
, . r . ••) « i ! * * 
oooOooo 
The issues raised by the Order to ^how Cause heretofore 
issued by the Court, was heard before the 
District Judge, on Tuesday, March 24, 19 
Honorable David Young, 
87. Present at said 
hearing were Robert M. McDonald representing defendant and Mary 
Corporon representing plaintiff. The Court having heard the 
testimony and proffers submitted by the respective parties, and 
having heard the arguments of counsel, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant shall have the right to visit the child born 
of the marriage, Nicole, age 10, at the following times: 
(a) Every other weekend beginning on Friday 
evening at 5:00 p.m. and ending Sunday evening at 
6:00 p.m.; 
1 
(b) Visitation on one weekday fcj>r a period of 
three hours during those weeks when tljiere is no weekend 
visitation and said visitation shall take place on 
Wednesday of such week unless defendant designates 
a different date on or before Sunday d>f said week; 
(c) Summer vacation visitation for a period of 
six weeks during the months of June, July and August of 
each calendar year the dates to be designated by 
defendant; 
(d) Visitation on every Father'^ Day for a period 
of six hours designated by defendant; 
(e) During even numbered calendar years holiday 
visitation for eight hours to be designated by 
defendant on New Year's Day, Easter, Independence 
Day, Labor Day and Thanksgiving and ir^  odd numbered 
calendar years on President's Day, Memorial Day, 
Pioneer Day, Veterans Day and Christmas Day; 
(f) During odd numbered calendar years when 
defendant does not have visitation fot the entire 
Christmas Day, defendant shall have visitation for a 
period of two hours on Christmas Day; 
(g) Visitation for an entire 6aj/ during the 
child's Christmas holiday, the date tc|> be designated by 
defendant; 
(h) Visitation for two hours on m e child's 
birthday. 
Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before the Thursday prior 
to weekend visitation if defendant will b4 unable to exercise 
such weekend visitation. 
2. Plaintiff shall not in any njanner, directly or 
indirectly, impair plaintiff from making telephone contact with 
the minor child, Nicole. Plaintiff shall u^e her best efforts to 
facilitate and encourage telephone contact 
said child. 
3. Control of the former family hom^ located at 2740 East 
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall forthwith be transferred 
to defendant. In this regard, plainti 
deliver to defendant keys to all locks in; 
between defendant and 
|Ef shall immediately 
the home and keys to 
all locks on appurtenant structures and a c0py of the most recent 
listing agreement. Thereafter, defendant shall have full and 
exclusive authority to: (a) negotiate^ execute, amend, or 
terminate listing agreements with respect to the home; (b) 
supervise and control any activity ob arrangement deemed 
necessary by defendant to facilitate the iale of the home; (c) 
negotiate, arrange or terminate any interirt^  rental agreement with 
respect to the home; (d) make any arrangement, improvement or 
repair which defendant feels will facilitate sale of the home to 
be paid from the proceeds of sale of the house. Provided, 
however, that the home shall not be sold except at a price and 
upon terms acceptable to both parties. Inj the event the parties 
cannot agree as to the selling price or terms of sale, the matter 
shall be submitted to the Court. 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divojrce heretofore entered 
in this action is construed as follows: upon plaintiff's 
remarriage, defendant is relieved from any 
make the monthly installment payments on 
further obligation to 
the mortgage on the 
family home, but defendant's obligation fdr child support shall 
f the monthly mortgage 
n said home, defendant 
be increased in a sum equal to two-thirds oji 
payment. By reason of defendant's equity iji 
shall have the option to make the monthly installment payment on 
the family home and shall receive full cr4dit against his child 
support obligations. 
5. The judgment heretofore entered by the Court on or 
about March 24, 1986, in the principal sum bf $2,705.50 is hereby 
vacated and set aside. 
6, The Court finds that defendant i^ current with respect 
to all obligations for child support up t<t> and including March 
31, 1987. 
1. Judgment is hereby entered, in flavor of defendant and 
against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 representing a portion of 
the costs and attorney's fees incurred by defendant in obtaining 
this Order. 
8. Inasmuch as plaintiff has paid and discharged the 
orthodontic bill, the dispute relating thereto has been 
resolved. 
4 
DATED th is fip- day of April, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A ir T* T~ r*. -/-
H. Di'*OW H**XIY 
IAT^.. 
I hereby certify that on the Q dky of April, 1987, I 
served a true and accurate copy of an Order upon plaintiff by 
depositing said copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Mary C. Corporon 
Attorney at Law 
Corporon & Williams 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City; Utah 84111 
•*pm* Ctark 
C. 
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